



**THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATION, THE DEVELOPMENT OF  
TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM IN ALGERIA: THE NORTH AFRICAN  
SECURITY EXPERIENCE**

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ABSTRACT	KEYWORDS
<p>This article analyzes the socio-political processes, public administration, security policy, historical formation, and contemporary transformation of terrorism and extremism in the Republic of Algeria within the framework of the IMRAD structure. Algeria is one of the most important geopolitical actors in North Africa, and its security experience is closely connected with the legacy of colonialism, the war of independence, the civil war of the 1990s, armed Islamist movements, the emergence of AQIM, instability in the Sahel region, and the Hirak movement of 2019. The study employs political analysis, a historical-institutional approach, comparative analysis, content analysis, and the case study method. The article argues that terrorism is not merely a product of religious radicalism, but a complex phenomenon related to political exclusion, institutional crisis, socio-economic discontent, historical memory, and transboundary security challenges. The findings indicate that although Algeria has significantly limited the large-scale operational capacity of terrorist groups within its territory, issues related to border areas, youth employment, political trust, economic diversification, and regional cooperation remain relevant risk factors. Algeria's experience offers important scientific and practical lessons for Uzbekistan in preventing extremism, strengthening religious and educational immunity, harmonizing youth policy with the concept of security, and deepening regional security cooperation.</p>	<p>Algeria, socio-political situation, terrorism, extremism, AQIM, Hirak, North Africa, Sahel, security policy.</p>

**Introduction**

The Republic of Algeria holds a distinct position within the socio-political, historical, and security framework of North Africa. It is the largest country in Africa by landmass, a major energy resource powerhouse in the Arab world, and a strategic space connecting the Mediterranean, Maghreb, Sahara, and Sahel regions. Algeria's contemporary political landscape has been shaped by 132 years of French colonial rule, the liberation war of 1954–1962, post-independence nation-building, the influential role of the military-political elite, the civil war of the 1990s, and extensive experience in countering terrorism. Therefore, the Algerian case must be examined not merely as the domestic political history

of a single state, but as a complex model of regional security, post-colonial state-building, and countering extremism.<sup>1</sup>

The relevance of this topic is determined by several key factors. First, the Algerian experience demonstrates how the lack of consistent and inclusive political reforms, a crisis of trust between the state and the opposition, and institutional gridlock can create a social fertile ground for radical groups. Second, the armed Islamist groups that emerged during the civil war of the 1990s subsequently transformed into transnational terrorist networks. According to the United Nations Security Council, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) originally formed in Algeria in 1998 as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which split from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and rebranded as AQIM in 2007. This case highlights the mechanism through which localized political violence escalates into a regional and global threat.<sup>2</sup>

Third, Algeria continues to navigate a complex security environment. Its eastern and southern borders are deeply intertwined with the volatile security situations in Libya, Mali, Niger, and Tunisia, while to the west, relations with Morocco and the Western Sahara issue persistently exacerbate geopolitical tensions. The OSAC (Overseas Security Advisory Council) 2025 Security Report notes that while terrorist groups maintain a residual presence within Algerian territory, their operational capabilities have been significantly constrained by Algerian military operations; nonetheless, risks of kidnappings, armed group activities, and cross-border threats persist in remote border regions. Consequently, Algerian security cannot be viewed merely as an isolated domestic issue, but rather as an indispensable component of the Sahel, Maghreb, and Mediterranean security architectures.

Fourth, the Algerian socio-political system faced a novel trial with the onset of the Hirak movement in 2019. Although this movement initially ignited to protest former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's bid for a fifth term in office, it rapidly evolved into a broad-based demand for sweeping political reforms, anti-corruption measures, civilian governance, and systemic political renewal. The defining characteristic of the Hirak was its mass, peaceful, and civic nature. Simultaneously, in subsequent years, international organizations turned their focus toward restrictions on protests, pressure on the opposition, the shrinking of civil society space, and a broad interpretation of counter-terrorism legislation. In its 2025 report, Freedom House highlights that counter-terrorism laws in Algeria are being deployed against opposition figures, while the political influence of military structures remains entrenched.

The core research problem of this study is formulated as follows: How have socio-political processes in Algeria influenced the formation, development, transformation, and containment of terrorism and extremism? To address this question, it is insufficient to explain terrorism solely through the lens of religious ideologies or external influences. Instead, it must be analyzed in conjunction with the political system, historical memory, economic opportunities, youth prospects, regional instability, border security, and state legitimacy.

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<sup>1</sup> World Bank. Algeria Overview. — Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2026. — URL: <https://www.worldbank.org/ext/en/country/algeria> Date: 20.06.2026; Martinez L. The Algerian Civil War, 1990–1998. — New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. — 300 p.

<sup>2</sup> United Nations Security Council. The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb: ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Narrative Summary. — New York: United Nations, 2023. — URL: [https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1267/aq\\_sanctions\\_list/summaries/entity/the-organization-of-al-qaida-in-the-islamic](https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/the-organization-of-al-qaida-in-the-islamic) Date: 20.06.2026.

The primary objective of this article is to comprehensively examine Algeria's socio-political situation alongside the evolution of terrorism and extremism, to identify the strengths and vulnerabilities of the country's security strategy, and to derive scientific and practical conclusions applicable to Uzbekistan. The scientific novelty of this research lies in its interpretation of the Algerian experience not merely as a conventional counter-terrorism model, but as a phenomenon intrinsically linked to post-colonial state-building, political legitimacy, youth policy, religious-educational immunity, and cross-border security.

## MAIN BODY

Foreign scholarly literature on Algeria can be categorized into several thematic directions.

The first direction focuses on the colonial legacy and national state-building. According to this approach, French colonialism left not only economic and demographic imprints on Algeria but also profoundly shaped its political memory, national identity, and foreign policy culture. The national liberation ideology forged during the war of independence transformed the principles of state sovereignty, resistance to foreign intervention, and anti-colonial solidarity into primary sources of political legitimacy. Consequently, emphasizing sovereignty, non-interference, and political solutions has long remained a cornerstone of Algerian foreign policy.<sup>3</sup>

The second direction explores the processes of post-1988 political liberalization, the rise of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and the civil war of the 1990s. This period is of central importance for understanding the dramatic escalation of extremism and terrorism in Algeria. Numerous researchers have analyzed the complex linkages between the suspension of the electoral process, the transformation of political competition into armed confrontation, state repression, and the violence perpetrated by radical groups. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) left deep scars on Algerian society by resorting to violence against civilians, targeting intellectuals, journalists, civil servants, and security forces. The memory of the civil war continues to serve as a key driver in contemporary political culture, reinforcing security as one of the ultimate values.<sup>4</sup>

The third direction focuses on AQIM, Sahel security, and transnational terrorism. United Nations Security Council documents indicate that AQIM originated from the GSPC, announced its intent to target Western assets after aligning with al-Qaeda, and operated across southern Algeria, northern Mali, eastern Mauritania, and western Niger. This data underscores that terrorist networks do not confine themselves to a single state; instead, they adapt to the regional system by exploiting weak governance, desert geography, illicit trafficking, and porous borders.<sup>5</sup>

The fourth direction pertains to Algeria's political system, the role of military structures, and civil society issues. Organizations such as Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, and others note that although formal multi-party pluralism exists in Algeria, political competition is constrained, and various administrative and legal pressures are exerted on the activities of the opposition and civil society. These analyses highlight the delicate balance between security policy and political liberties.

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<sup>3</sup> Halil A. R. The Relations Between Algeria and France in the Shadow of Colonial Legacy: A New Page Possible? // Bölgesel Araştırmalar Dergisi. — 2021. — Vol. 5, No. 2. — P. 701–725.

<sup>4</sup> Martinez L. The Algerian Civil War, 1990–1998. — New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. — 300 p.; Roberts H. The Battlefield: Algeria 1988–2002: Studies in a Broken Polity. — London; New York: Verso, 2003. — 402 p.

<sup>5</sup> United Nations Security Council. The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb: ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Narrative Summary. — New York: United Nations, 2023. — URL: [https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1267/aq\\_sanctions\\_list/summaries/entity/the-organization-of-al-qaida-in-the-islamic](https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/the-organization-of-al-qaida-in-the-islamic) Date: 20.06.2026.

While the state may pursue counter-terrorism as a legitimate mandate, the overly broad interpretation of counter-terrorism discourse poses a risk of framing public dissent and political opposition as security threats.<sup>6</sup>

The fifth direction focuses on economic and socio-demographic factors. According to World Bank data, the Algerian economy is heavily dependent on hydrocarbon revenues: between 2019 and 2023, the hydrocarbon sector accounted for 14% of GDP, 83% of total exports, and 47% of budget revenues; by 2024, the overall unemployment rate stood at 12.7%, while youth unemployment reached 29.3%. These metrics serve as critical indicators for analyzing social grievances, youth migration, economic expectations, and susceptibility to radical ideologies. While terrorism does not stem directly from poverty, a lack of opportunities, political mistrust, and a perceived sense of social injustice can foster a fertile psychological ground for extremist narratives.<sup>7</sup>

The sixth direction is dedicated to the Arab Spring and the Hirak movement. Although the revolutionary processes observed in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya in 2011 heightened protest sentiments in Algeria, the country did not follow the path of a large-scale violent revolution due to the lingering memory of its civil war. Conversely, the 2019 Hirak movement demonstrated a novel social energy: society demanded systemic political renewal while consciously abstaining from violence. This phenomenon reflects the civic maturity of Algerian society and its acute awareness of historical lessons. Meanwhile, the subsequent shrinking of the protest space in the post-Hirak era leaves the question of the political system's institutional flexibility open.<sup>8</sup>

Existing literature indicates that the Algerian experience cannot be explained by a single-factor approach. In this country, terrorism and extremism developed dynamically in tandem with religious radicalism, political crisis, state security institutions, post-colonial memory, economic dependence, regional instability, and youth prospects. This article expands upon this multi-factorial framework to identify key security lessons from the Algerian experience applicable to Uzbekistan.

The study was conducted using qualitative analysis. The first method is political analysis, which enables an assessment of the institutional structure of the Algerian political system, presidential power, the military-political elite, political parties, civil society, and the interconnectedness of security institutions. Through political analysis, the linkages between state legitimacy, political participation, the space for opposition, and security policy are identified.

The second method is the historical-institutional approach. This approach serves to examine the Algerian colonial era, the war of independence, FLN (National Liberation Front) rule, the political role of military structures, post-1988 liberalization, the 1990s civil war, and the post-Hirak era in a continuous chronological sequence. Viewing terrorism and extremism not merely as contemporary security dilemmas but as products of historical processes enhances the depth of the scholarly conclusions.

The third method is comparative regional analysis. When compared to Libya, Mali, Tunisia, and Morocco, Algeria exhibits a distinct model regarding state capacity, the stability of military institutions,

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<sup>6</sup> Freedom House. *Algeria: Freedom in the World 2025*. — Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2025. — URL: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/algeria/freedom-world/2025> Date: 20.06.2026; Bertelsmann Stiftung. *BTI 2024 Country Report — Algeria*. — Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2024.

<sup>7</sup> World Bank. *Algeria Overview*. — Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2026. — URL: <https://www.worldbank.org/ext/en/country/algeria> Date: 20.06.2026; International Monetary Fund. *Algeria: 2025 Article IV Consultation — Press Release and Staff Report*. — Washington, DC: IMF, 2025.

<sup>8</sup> Hemchi M., Benantar A. *The 2019 Hirak and the Arab Spring Uprisings: The Limits of the Algerian Exception Narrative? // AlMuntaqa*. — 2023. — Vol. 6, No. 2. — P. 31–50.

border security, political memory, and crisis response strategies. This comparative framework helps explain why Algeria did not descend into a state collapse akin to Libya, or transform into a zone of protracted insurgency like Mali and the broader Sahel.

The fourth method is content analysis. The study analyzed open-source data, reports, and assessments provided by the UN Security Council, OSAC, Freedom House, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and scholarly literature. Content analysis reveals the specific contexts in which core concepts—such as terrorism, extremism, political repression, border security, economic diversification, youth unemployment, and regional cooperation—are deployed.

The fifth method is the case study approach, which entails an in-depth exploration of Algeria as a distinct case. Algeria constitutes a theoretically and practically rich object of research, as it encapsulates the experiences of civil war, the transnationalization of terrorist networks, a robust security apparatus, post-colonial foreign policy, and peaceful mass protests. Concurrently, the study accounted for data limitations regarding terrorism, the political interpretation of certain events, and discrepancies between state reports and independent evaluations.

The rise of terrorism and extremism in Algeria cannot be explained solely by religious dogmas or external ideological influences. The armed conflict of the 1990s was structurally linked to a crisis of trust between the state and society, the suspension of the electoral process, political mobilization around the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), economic hardship, and the escalation of state coercion. Although radical groups utilized religious slogans, their mobilization capacity was fueled by political closure, a perceived sense of injustice, and social despair.

This phenomenon underscores that a purely securitized approach is insufficient for preventing terrorism. While security institutions can constrain the operational capabilities of armed groups, the likelihood of new forms of extremist narratives emerging will not diminish if the political and social environment generating radicalization remains intact. Therefore, the Algerian experience demonstrates the necessity of viewing political inclusiveness, civic trust, and legal justice as integral components of counter-extremism policy.

The violence of the 1990s transformed stability and security into paramount political values within Algerian society. The memory of the civil war conditioned society to adopt a cautious stance toward political upheaval. Consequently, although protests were observed in Algeria during the 2011 Arab Spring, a large-scale violent revolution did not materialize. The 2019 Hirak movement similarly articulated its demands through predominantly peaceful means.

However, this security memory exerts a dual effect. On one hand, it insulates society from extremist appeals and serves as a reminder of the severe consequences of state collapse. On the other hand, the state can leverage this memory as a tool to restrict political dissent, frame reformist demands as security threats, or monitor civil society activism. Therefore, while historical memory strengthens stability, it must not stifle political renewal.

This dynamics directly pertains to the efficacy of Algerian security policy. Through military and intelligence structures, border control, amnesty policies, and long-standing counterinsurgency experience, Algeria has significantly reduced major domestic terrorist operations. The OSAC 2025 report notes that although AQIM, its affiliates, and ISIS-linked elements maintain a presence in Algeria, their capabilities remain constrained due to Algeria's successful counter-terrorism operations.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> OSAC. Algeria Country Security Report. — Washington, DC: Overseas Security Advisory Council, U.S. Department of State, 2025. — URL: <https://www.osac.gov/Content/Report/b7e9876d-31fa-4ec1-bebc-1c2257891373> Date: 20.06.2026.

However, the threat has not been entirely eliminated; rather, it has metastasized. The primary operational capabilities of terrorist groups have shifted toward desert terrains, border zones, areas of Sahelian instability, illicit trafficking corridors, and regions characterized by weak governance. This dynamic underscores that conducting counter-terrorism initiatives solely within national borders is no longer sufficient. For Algeria, maintaining a robust security dialogue with Mali, Niger, Libya, Tunisia, and Mauritania remains of vital strategic importance.<sup>10</sup>

This dynamics is structurally linked to Algerian geography. While Algeria possesses significant strategic depth, its vast territory and extensive borders simultaneously complicate security oversight. The southern and eastern regions are directly intertwined with the crises in Libya and Mali, characterized by weapon flows, contraband smuggling, undocumented migration, and the movement of militant factions. According to the OSAC report, remote areas along Algeria's eastern and southern borders represent some of the highest concentrations of kidnapping risks.

This reality shifts peripheral regions into the core focus of state policy. Border security is not merely a matter of military patrols or checkpoints; it is intrinsically linked to infrastructure, cultivating trust with the local population, transport, education, economic activity, water resources, digital connectivity, and the accessibility of public services. If peripheral areas are treated solely as securitized objects, local populations may feel marginalized by the center, creating fertile ground for the social influence of radical networks.

Although Algeria is a nation endowed with abundant hydrocarbon resources, the heavy dependence of its economic structure on oil and gas imposes constraints on sustainable development. World Bank data indicates that between 2019 and 2023, the hydrocarbon sector generated 83% of total exports and 47% of budget revenues, while youth unemployment stood at 29.3% in 2024. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in its 2025 consultation materials, notes that the post-pandemic recovery was sustained by high hydrocarbon prices and robust public spending.

Such a structural framework generates a disconnect between public expectations and state capacity. The population, particularly the youth, expects quality employment, decent income, housing, professional growth, and avenues for political participation. When the state fails to meet these expectations, protest sentiments intensify. While these grievances do not invariably translate into violent extremism, radical groups persistently attempt to weaponize them for their ideological narratives. Consequently, economic diversification, youth entrepreneurship, and aligning the educational system with labor market demands must be integrated as core components of national security policy.

Counter-terrorism remains a constitutional mandate for any sovereign state. However, if counter-terrorism legislation is interpreted too broadly or ambiguously, it risks conflating violent extremists with peaceful political opposition or civil society activists. In its 2025 assessment, Freedom House documented instances where counter-terrorism laws in Algeria were deployed against members of the political opposition.<sup>11</sup>

Such an approach may tighten control in the short term, but it diminishes trust in the state over the long term. Citizens must see that the state clearly distinguishes between the peaceful expression of opinions

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<sup>10</sup> Council on Foreign Relations. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. — New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2015. — URL: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb> Date: 20.06.2026

<sup>11</sup> Human Rights Watch. World Report 2025: Algeria. — New York: Human Rights Watch, 2025. — URL: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/algeria> Date: 20.06.2026. Freedom House. Algeria: Freedom in the World 2025. — Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2025.

and violent extremism. If legal ambiguity increases and political criticism is framed as a security threat, a sense of alienation will intensify within society. This, in turn, erodes the moral and institutional foundations of countering extremism.

The country traditionally relies on the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, the political resolution of conflicts, and regional mediation. This approach grants Algeria strategic autonomy and projects it as a nation with a distinct voice within the African Union, the Arab League, and the Non-Aligned Movement.<sup>12</sup>

However, the volatile situations surrounding the Sahel, Libya, and the Western Sahara persistently complicate this traditional doctrine. In an era where terrorism has assumed a cross-border dimension, relying solely on the principle of non-interference is no longer sufficient. While preserving its core sovereign principles, Algeria must enhance actionable intelligence sharing, joint border security coordination, regional economic development initiatives, and proactive diplomatic mediation. This dimension is equally vital for Uzbekistan: contemporary national security cannot be effectively sustained in isolation from regional security frameworks.

From the perspective of international relations and security theory, the Algerian experience yields several critical conclusions. First, state capacity is of paramount importance in countering terrorism. Robust military and intelligence institutions, stringent border control, rapid intelligence analysis, and territorial oversight effectively constrain the large-scale operational capabilities of terrorist factions. In this regard, Algeria has demonstrated a superior institutional capacity compared to many states in the region. However, unless state capacity is closely aligned with political legitimacy, long-term stability cannot be fully sustained.

Second, political legitimacy serves as a soft yet powerful pillar of any security strategy. When citizens perceive the state as just, accountable, and legally bound, it becomes inherently difficult for extremist narratives to gain social traction. Conversely, political closure, systemic corruption, doubts surrounding judicial independence, and the shrinking of civil society space create a psychological vacuum for radical ideologies. While the memory of the civil war has helped contemporary Algerian society prioritize stability, this historical memory must not be instrumentally deployed to dismiss legitimate demands for political reform.

Third, religious-educational policy plays a central role in countering violent extremism. In Algeria, radical networks attempted to justify their violence through religious slogans. However, the Islamic religious heritage fundamentally rejects violence, aggression against innocent human lives, or the subversion of the state. Therefore, prioritizing scholarly rigor, moderation, local traditions, jurisprudential (*fiqh*) literacy, and open dialogue with youth in the religious sphere remains vital. This dimension holds immense significance for Uzbekistan as well. Uzbekistan's rich heritage—embodied by scholars such as Imam al-Bukhari, Imam al-Tirmidhi, Abu Mansur al-Maturidi, and Bahauddin Naqshband—forges a powerful spiritual and intellectual foundation against radical misinterpretations. Fourth, economic policy and national security policy are inextricably linked. In Algeria, hydrocarbon revenues funded public expenditures and temporarily shored up social stability. Nevertheless, resource dependency fails to comprehensively address systemic issues such as youth employment, private sector expansion, and an innovative knowledge economy. The most sustainable form of security is an economic system that offers citizens a viable future. Consequently, youth policy, vocational training,

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<sup>12</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung. BTI 2024 Country Report — Algeria. — Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2024. — URL: <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/DZA> Date: 20.06.2026.

the digital economy, small business development, and regional infrastructure planning must stand at the core of any comprehensive counter-extremism strategy.

Fifth, regional security cannot be detached from national security frameworks. Although terrorist networks have been heavily restricted within Algerian territory, the chronic instability in the Sahel and Libya continuously generates novel cross-border threats. Similarly, in the context of Uzbekistan, challenges such as the situation in Afghanistan, wider Central Asian security dynamics, transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, and online radicalization necessitate robust regional cooperation. The Algerian experience demonstrates that securing national borders must be pursued in tandem with fostering political stability, promoting economic development, and sustaining proactive diplomatic dialogue within neighboring territories.<sup>13</sup>

Sixth, counter-terrorism legislation must be highly precise and proportionate. The primary objective of countering terrorism is to protect society from violence. If legislation interprets peaceful dissent, journalism, political criticism, or civic activism as security threats, the trust between the state and society will inevitably erode. The Algerian experience demonstrates that losing the delicate balance between security and liberty does not diminish radicalization in the long term; instead, it amplifies social alienation.

Seventh, the Algerian experience highlights the primacy of prevention for Uzbekistan. Combating terrorism after it manifests incurs immense social, economic, and human costs. The most effective path is the prevention of radicalization itself. To this end, a harmonious cooperation is required among education, the *mahalla* (local community), the family, religious institutions, higher education institutions, youth organizations, the mass media, and security structures. Prevention is not merely a system of prohibitions and surveillance; rather, it is a comprehensive framework of trust, enlightenment, employment, justice, and social protection.

Eighth, the core strength of the Algerian model lies in the extensive experience of its security institutions, robust military capacity, stringent border control, and the ability to maintain continuous pressure on terrorist networks. Conversely, its vulnerabilities manifest in issues surrounding political openness, civil society expansion, and economic diversification. Consequently, the overarching lesson derived from the Algerian experience is that security is not sustained by coercion alone, but is reinforced through just institutions, sustainable development, and civic trust.

## CONCLUSION

Terrorism in Algeria is not merely a product of religious radicalism; it is a complex phenomenon shaped in tandem with political exclusion, institutional crises, civil war, social grievances, a lack of economic opportunities, regional instability, and transnational ideological networks.

As a state, Algeria has achieved substantial results in countering terrorism. The country's security structures have successfully constrained the domestic capabilities of AQIM and its affiliates, tightened security oversight in major cities and strategic assets, and enhanced military readiness in border regions. However, the threat has not been entirely eradicated. It persists in novel configurations through Sahelian and Libyan instability, remote border desert terrains, illicit trafficking networks, radical propaganda, youth unemployment, and challenges to political trust.

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<sup>13</sup> OSAC. Algeria Country Security Report. – Washington, DC: Overseas Security Advisory Council, U.S. Department of State, 2025. – URL: <https://www.osac.gov/Content/Report/b7e9876d-31fa-4ec1-bebc-1c2257891373> Date: 20.06.2026.

From a scholarly perspective, this article interprets the Algerian experience as a multi-factorial security model. Viewing counter-terrorism solely through a military or policing lens is insufficient. It yields maximum efficacy only when integrated with political legitimacy, economic development, social justice, religious-educational immunity, legal precision, and proactive regional diplomacy. This holistic approach enriches the theory of violent extremism prevention and provides a practical framework for analyzing the security policies of post-colonial states.

Several critical dimensions of the Algerian experience can be adapted to the context of Uzbekistan. First, while robust security institutions are indispensable for maintaining stability, they must operate in harmony with societal trust and legal justice. Second, youth policy must be treated as a strategic priority of national security. Third, religious education must remain moderate, scholarly, and anchored in the national spiritual heritage. Fourth, counter-terrorism legislation must clearly differentiate between violent extremism and peaceful civic activism. Fifth, regional cooperation, border security, and continuous diplomatic dialogue remain vital in countering extremism.

Moving forward, it is expedient to advance research on Algeria across three primary vectors: first, conducting an in-depth exploration of the post-Hirak political system transformation; second, empirically analyzing the impact of Sahelian instability on Algerian national security; and third, undertaking a comparative study of the preventive counter-extremism policies of Algeria and Uzbekistan. Ultimately, the Algerian experience serves to deepen the understanding of prevention, enlightenment, and regional stability, not only for North African security but also for the states of Central Asia.

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